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“As a political matter, piecemeal legislation to address 
inequitable conduct is not realistic.  A call for simply relieving 
patent attorneys and applicants from the consequences of ‘fraud’ 
and ‘inequitable conduct’ will hardly evoke sympathetic 
attention from busy legislators and committee staffs.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
A key element of our patent system is the desire to prevent a 
patentee from benefiting from potentially fraudulent behavior during 
the patent application process. Policing patent fraud prevents a patentee 
from obtaining a significant monopoly, either through active 
 
* Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School.  This Article is dedicated to Mary 
Jane Saunders and The Honorable Catherine Curtis Blake.  I would like to thank Alison 
Julien for her invaluable editorial comments.  I would also like to thank Barry Grossman of 
Foley & Lardner, LLP for his suggestion to conduct initial research on these issues.   
* J.D., Marquette University Law School, 2009; M.B.A., Marquette University Graduate 
School of Management, 2000; Ph.D., University of Notre Dame, 1998. Admitted to practice 
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2001.  Dr. Vinarov will join 
McDonnell, Boehnen, Hulbert & Berghoff LLP as an associate in Fall of 2009. 
1. Harold C. Wegner, Inequitable Conduct and the Proper Roles of Patent Attorney and 
Examiner in an Era of International Patent Harmonization, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 38, 64 n.96 (1988).  
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malfeasance or passive complicity, by disclosing incorrect or inaccurate 
information to the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”).  Beyond this equitable basis, the existence of legal 
mechanisms that prevent patent fraud serves to uphold the fundamental 
basis of the “patent bargain,” which rests on the full and accurate 
disclosure of all relevant information relating to the invention.2  Thus, 
the existence of policing mechanisms for fraud—in any form—is 
absolutely vital to uphold the transparency of any patent system.   
A significant challenge exists, then, where, as in the United States, 
the policing mechanisms for fraud are deeply compromised by a 
jurisprudential standard that has created confusion for the patent 
community.  We speak, of course, of the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit’s (“Federal Circuit”) recent re-examination of the 
materiality standard for the doctrine of inequitable conduct in cases 
such as eSpeed, Inc. v. BrokerTec USA, L.L.C.,3 McKesson Information 
Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc.,4 Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc.,5 
and Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.6  The difficulty of 
policing fraud mechanisms arises from one particular jurisprudential 
choice: the Federal Circuit’s failure to adopt the current materiality 
standard outlined in Rule 1.56(b).7  This current standard replaced the 
earlier “reasonable examiner” standard, originally promulgated by 
USPTO in 1977.8  While the Federal Circuit has affirmed findings of 
materiality based upon the 1992 Rule 1.56 standard,9 it has declined to 
specifically address whether the 1992 Rule 1.56 standard replaced the 
1977 “reasonable examiner” standard. Indeed, the Federal Circuit 
began to suggest that the sole standard should be the “reasonable 
examiner” standard.10  These varying approaches have created a 
 
2. Jeanne Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 599 (2009) (assessing 
disclosure function of patent law). 
3. 480 F.3d 1129, 1136-37 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
4. 487 F.3d 897, 901-27 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
5. 504 F.3d 1223, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
6. 518 F.3d 1353, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
7. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1992). 
8. See Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (noting that the USPTO “amended its rules to provide a different standard for 
materiality”). 
9. See infra note 31 for a review of cases that apply this relevant standard.    
10. See, e.g., eSpeed, 480 F.3d at 1136 (stating that, under the reasonable examiner 
standard, information is material when “a reasonable examiner would consider it important 
in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent”) (internal quotations 
omitted); McKesson Info., 487 F.3d at 908, 913 (stating that “[m]ateriality . . . embraces any 
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jurisprudential jumble that fails to offer significant certainty in assessing 
what standard will be applied to assess materiality during prosecution 
and enforcement of an issued patent.  
The Federal Circuit’s jurisprudential choice has proven once again 
to be controversial prompting new scholarly solutions11 and new 
legislative proposals.12  The controversy is organizing itself along 
 
information that a reasonable examiner would substantially likely consider important in 
deciding whether to allow an application to issue as a patent,” and further stating that failure 
to disclose the Baker patent met the “reasonable examiner” materiality standard and should 
have been disclosed to the examiner because “[i]f the same art had been before the examiners 
and the claims are substantially similar, [that is] probably a pretty good indication that the 
reference would be pretty material”) (internal quotations omitted); Nilssen, 504 F.3d at 1235 
(“[The i]nformation is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner 
would have considered the information important in deciding whether to allow the 
application to issue as a patent.”  In applying the “reasonable examiner” standard, the 
Federal Circuit stated that “[t]he fact that Nilssen had repeatedly cited or had cited to him 
the prior art references in question makes it highly likely that a reasonable examiner would 
have wanted to consider the information in the withheld patents in determining 
patentability.”) (internal quotations omitted); Pfizer, Inc., 518 F.3d at 1366 (stating that 
information is material for the purposes of an inequitable conduct determination if a 
reasonable examiner would have considered such prior art important in deciding whether to 
allow the parent application, and noting that, under the “reasonable examiner” standard, “a 
misstatement or omission may be material even if disclosure of that misstatement or omission 
would not have rendered the invention unpatentable”). 
11. See, e.g., Chris Henry, Comment, Inequitable Conduct Inequitably Conferred:  
When Do Patent Applicants’ Actions Intend to Deceive?, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1159, 1162 
(2008) (To establish an “intent to deceive in an inequitable conduct claim, in the absence of 
direct evidence of a subjective intent to deceive, an accused infringer should have to prove, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that a patentee acted objectively reckless—that the patentee 
acted in the face of what the person having ordinary skill in the art (the PHOSITA) would 
recognize as an objectively high likelihood that the patentee’s actions constituted either a 
failure to disclose material information, or a submission of false material information”); 
Elizabeth Peters, Note, Are We Living in a Material World?:  An Analysis of the Federal 
Circuit’s Materiality Standard, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1519, 1577 (2008) (contending that the 
doctrine of inequitable conduct should be undertaken using a prima facie materiality 
standard); James Cronin, Why the Federal Circuit Should Use the Reasonable Examiner 
Standard, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1327 (2006) (assessing the varying standards outlined by the 
Federal Circuit and arguing that the reasonable examiner standard should be applied in the 
inequitable conduct context).  
12. Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. §11(a)–(b) (2008) (proposing two 
types of administrative proceedings to establish patent fraud); Patent Reform Act of 2007, 
H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 12(c) (2007) (amended Section 282 to add patent reform as an 
additional defense and adopts the reasonable examiner standard as the relevant defense); 
Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 5 (2005) (amended duty of candor to 
add an intent requirement to the materiality standard); Amendment in the Nature of a 
Substitute to H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 5(a) (2005) (creating office in the USPTO to analyze 
an inequitable standard).  For articles discussing these legislative proposals, see Matthew M. 
Peters, The Equitable Inequitable:  Adding Proportionality and Predictability to Inequitable 
Conduct in the Patent Reform Act of 2008, 19 DEPAUL J. ART. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 77 
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familiar lines as everyone offers different ways of revising the 
materiality standard. One more stab at revising the materiality standard, 
at this point, may simply not work.  In fact, instead of revising the 
materiality standard and the broader doctrine of inequitable conduct—
of which the materiality standard is a key element—it might be time to 
revisit the implicit bargain represented by the entire doctrine of 
inequitable conduct.   
This implicit bargain consists of three key assumptions.  First, the 
doctrine of inequitable conduct itself rests in equity rather than an 
articulated statutory standard.13  Second, the doctrine of inequitable 
conduct presumes only a competitor (and not other interested third 
parties or the government) can effectively police the patent fraud.14  
Third, the doctrine of inequitable conduct asserts the best way for a 
competitor to raise the issue of patent fraud is as a defense (and not 
through an independent private right of action).15  These assumptions, 
however, have posed difficult problems.  The equitable nature of the 
doctrine causes significant institutional conflict between the USPTO 
and the Federal Circuit.  Patent practitioners are still waiting for 
guidance about the “material information” every person associated with 
a patent application is expected to disclose.  Equally profound, these 
assumptions may be increasingly out of sync with the type of patent 
reform contemplated by congressional reform.  The movement from a 
first-to-invent system to a first-to-file system will involve a significant 
reshaping of the current system.  The implicit bargain may have to be 
revisited in light of the new priorities of a revised patent system.   
Unlike in 1988, when Harold Wegner wrote the words that preface 
this Article, “busy legislators” and “committee staffs” are finally paying 
attention to re-evaluating the current structure of patent law.16  With this 
reform in mind, this Article seeks to examine two issues.  First, after 
reviewing the Federal Circuit’s latest jurisprudence in this area, this 
Article will examine why the doctrine of inequitable conduct remains a 
deeply compromised and ultimately unworkable standard.  Second, this 
Article explores the way in which the patent fraud mechanisms can be 
 
(2008) (assessing usefulness of suggested inequitable conduct proceedings in the Patent 
Reform Act of 2008); Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent 
Quality:  Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 157–59 (2006) (assessing 
amendments to Patent Reform Act of 2005). 
13. See infra Part I.A. 
14. See infra Part I.B.  
15. Id.  
16. See Wegner, supra note 1.  
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rewritten in light of current reform efforts.  Any reform should begin 
with consciousness of two factors.  First, the response to the existence of 
patent fraud is tightly correlated with the larger concerns of the relevant 
patent regime.  Second, any enforcement should be cognizant of 
ameliorating institutional conflict between the USPTO and the Federal 
Circuit. 
I.  A COMPROMISED STANDARD: THE CURRENT DOCTRINE OF 
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 
Often, complaints related to the doctrine of inequitable conduct 
focus on the fact that “too” many “spurious” inequitable conduct claims 
are made within the course of litigation.17  The problem, however, may 
instead result from two key “compromises” that underlie how the 
doctrine is implemented.  The first compromise—the equitable nature 
of the doctrine itself—may prompt significant institutional overreach on 
the part of the Federal Circuit.  A court analyzing an accusation of 
inequitable conduct must often undertake its assessment of patentee 
behavior at a significant temporal remove from the administrative 
context in which the decision occurred.  The Federal Circuit’s refusal to 
adopt any given standard of materiality, then, reflects its attempt to 
maintain the optimal institutional flexibility in assessing how an 
examiner would react to varying decisions made by both the patentee 
and examiner.  Of course, the Federal Circuit’s attempt to maintain its 
institutional flexibility comes at a deep cost.  The patentee is left with 
little guidance in understanding what kind of behavior will raise the 
specter of patent fraud.  The USPTO’s interest in maintaining clear 
guidelines concerning the prosecution of the patent is undermined.  The 
significant institutional power enjoyed by the Federal Circuit to 
undertake its equitable analysis is exacerbated by compromised 
administrative authority of the USPTO.  A weakened administrative 
actor simply may not be able to muster a response to a strong 
centralized actor, such as the Federal Circuit.  
The second compromise of the doctrine of inequitable conduct is 
perhaps, in the end, the most important and least understood 
compromise—the less than robust conception of the “public interest,” 
one of the deepest legacies of the Patent Act of 1952.  In particular, 
funneling the “public interest” through claims made by competitors may 
 
17. Benjamin Brown, Comment, Inequitable Conduct:  A Standard in Motion, 19 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 593, 607 (2009) (conducting empirical analysis 
of inequitable conduct litigation). 
MURRAY-VINAROV FINAL FORMATTED 6-9-09 REVISED 6-18-09 6/19/2009  2:53 PM 
268 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:2 
 
not be the optimal way of structuring assessment of fraudulent behavior.  
This Section considers each in turn. 
A. Compromised Implementation: Institutional Conflict in the 
Assessment of Inequitable Conduct 
Patent fraud enforcement in the modern era, as currently epitomized 
by the doctrine of inequitable conduct, can comfortably be analogized 
to a volcano: periods of stability punctuated by violent eruptions.  The 
causes of these periodic eruptions are linked to the basic “DNA” of the 
doctrine of inequitable conduct.  Initially, the doctrine of inequitable 
conduct is, at its core, an equitable determination.  In its current form, 
the doctrine requires that a trial court first assess whether a patentee, 
acting with the intent to deceive,18 failed to disclose or misrepresented 
material information to the USPTO.  It then weighs materiality and 
intent to determine whether the equities warrant a conclusion that 
inequitable conduct occurred.19  An equitable remedy, by its very 
 
18. See Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (outlining 
the elements of the doctrine of inequitable conduct).  The nondisclosure or misrepresentation 
must meet threshold levels of both materiality and intent.  GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 
F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (assessing the required threshold intent within the context of 
an inequitable conduct assessment).  A showing of materiality alone does not give rise to a 
presumption of an intent to deceive.  Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 
F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., 439 
F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[A] failure to disclose a prior art device to the [US]PTO, 
where the only evidence of intent is a lack of a good faith explanation for the nondisclosure, 
cannot constitute clear and convincing evidence sufficient to support a determination of 
culpable intent.”); Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 518 F.3d 1353, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(applying the standard set out in Ferring to conclude that no inference of intent was possible 
in the face of a credible good faith explanation for the withholding).  An inference of intent 
to deceive is generally appropriate, however, when (1) highly material information is 
withheld; (2) “the applicant knew of the information [and] . . . knew or should have known of 
the materiality of the information; and (3) the applicant has not provided a credible 
explanation for the withholding.”  Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1191 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006); see also Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 
1257 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[A] patentee facing a high level of materiality and clear proof that it 
knew or should have known of that materiality, can expect to find it difficult to establish 
‘subjective good faith’ sufficient to prevent the drawing of an inference of intent to 
mislead.”).        
19. Glaxo, 52 F.3d at 1048; see also Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 438 F.3d 
1123, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Once threshold findings of materiality and intent are 
established, the trial court must weigh them to determine whether the equities warrant a 
conclusion that inequitable conduct occurred.”).  The showing of intent can be proportionally 
less when balanced against high materiality.  Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 
267 F.3d 1370, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  In the converse, low levels of materiality require 
demonstration of higher intent.  Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 
1439 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The more material the omission, the less culpable the intent required, 
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nature, then, is a contextual determination that requires the court to 
assess the factual circumstances before it.20   
Moreover, this equitable remedy, through its requirement of 
materiality, necessarily depends on judicial assessment of complex 
administrative choices.  Judicial fact-finders, thus, are confronted with a 
particularly acute dilemma: evaluating how an individual examiner may 
have reacted to a number of complex choices undertaken by the patent 
applicant.  This position is not ideal position for any judge, and it is 
particularly problematic if the judge does not share the technical 
expertise of a patent examiner.  This judicial assessment is made even 
more complex since the judge has to evaluate the patent applicant’s 
behavior long after that behavior actually occurred.  The difficulty of 
this assessment, perhaps, explains why no less than four standards 
(along with the current standard articulated in Rule 1.56(b)) have been 
used to evaluate this choice.21   
These two basic elements of the “DNA,” which by themselves might 
be unobjectionable, together then operate to create significant 
conceptual uncertainty as to under what circumstances the doctrine will 
be triggered.  This significant uncertainty inherent in the contours of the 
doctrine itself is exacerbated by the varying institutional responses of 
the two primary actors in the patent regime, the Federal Circuit and the 
USPTO.   
The USPTO’s instinctual response has been to consistently seek to 
clarify the scope of the doctrine and its impact on practice before the 
 
and vice versa.”).     
20. An equitable determination in the fraud context differs from a legal recovery in 
fraud in two key respects.  First, in equity, the court could infer fraudulent intent from the 
nature of the transaction or its surrounding circumstances.   Second, in equity, the court could 
only order that the tainted transaction could be wiped out, whereas in at law, the party 
impacted by fraud could repudiate the contract and then seek restitution.  See Peter 
Rosenberg, The Assertion of a Fraud Upon the Patent Office as a Means of Defeating the 
Patent Monopoly, 7 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 455, 458 n.11 (1968).  The doctrine of inequitable 
conduct differs from common law fraud because it can lead to a declaration of patent fraud 
unenforceability and potential antitrust damages.  FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 
1411, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1987).   
21. Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(noting that these tests included: (1) “the objective ‘but for’ standard, where the 
misrepresentation was so material that the patent should not have issued; [(2)] the subjective 
‘but for’ test, where the misrepresentation actually caused the examiner to approve the patent 
application when he would not otherwise have done so; . . . [(3)] the ‘but it may have’ 
standard, where the misrepresentation may have influenced the patent examiner in the course 
of prosecution[;]” and (4) the 1977 Rule 1.56 “reasonable examiner” standard).  
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agency.22  The USPTO has attempted various approaches: (1) outlined 
the affirmative duties of patent practitioners, both substantively and 
procedurally;23 (2) narrowed the scope of the materiality standard, once 
in 1977 and again in 1992;24 and (3) suggested that no relationship exists 
between the materiality standard and the subsequent application of the 
doctrine of inequitable conduct.25  Obviously, the USPTO is not a 
selfless actor in this particular dynamic.  The agency may seek clarifying 
standards not because such standards are necessarily better, but rather 
because of its more direct accountability to a regulated community.  
Harry Manbeck, the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, in 
remarks upon passage of the revised materiality standard in 1992, 
stated, rather evocatively, that passage of such a standard was 
imperative because the agency would rather face a “sullen” regulated 
community, than a “mutinous” one.26 
By contrast, the Federal Circuit, since its inception in 1982, has 
sought to preserve its flexibility in assessing the equitable elements of 
inequitable conduct.27  In American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & 
Sons, Inc., the Federal Circuit (in an opinion authored by Judge Giles 
Rich) stated that, while the standard issued by the USPTO was a logical 
starting point, “[t]here is no reason . . . to be bound by any single 
standard, for the answer to any inquiry into fraud in the [US]PTO does 
not begin and end with materiality, nor can materiality be said to be 
unconnected to other considerations[.]”28  This statement neatly 
summarizes the institutional prerogatives at play in the Federal Circuit’s 
 
22. The USPTO introduced the affirmative duty of candor and good faith in 1977.  37 
C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1977) (“A duty of candor and good faith toward the Patent and Trademark 
Office rests on the inventor, on each attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the 
application and on every other individual who is substantively involved in the preparation or 
prosecution of the application[.]”); Patent Examining and Appeal Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 
5588, 5589 (Jan. 28, 1977) (publication of proposed rules related to the prosecution of the 
patent).   
23. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2009) (outlining the current duty of candor and good faith).   
24. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1977) (outlining the reasonable examiner standard); 37 
C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (1992) (outlining the materiality standard).   
25. See Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2026 (Jan. 17, 1992) (to be codified in 37 
C.F.R. pt. 1, 10) (stating the materiality amendments did not address issues related to fraud 
or inequitable conduct).   
26. Harry Manbeck, The Evolution and Future of New Rule 56 and the Duty of Candor:  
The Evolution and Issue of New Rule 56, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 136, 140 (1992). 
27. Richard A. Killworth, Federal Circuit Law on Inequitable Conduct:  The First Six 
Years, 29 IDEA 217, 219 (1989) (assessing the Federal Circuit’s commitment to the balancing 
of materiality and intent).  
28. 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
MURRAY-VINAROV FINAL FORMATTED 6-9-09 REVISED 6-18-09 6/19/2009  2:53 PM 
2009] RETHINKING PATENT FRAUD ENFORCEMENT 271 
 
actions with its insistence on the flexibility needed to undertake a 
sufficiently equitable analysis.   
Recent events illustrate the complex institutional conflict that 
undermines the effectiveness of our current patent fraud mechanism.  
Once again, the ongoing tension between the USPTO’s desire for 
clarity, and the Federal Circuit’s desire for flexibility, has prompted a 
crisis in the implementation of the current patent fraud mechanism.  In 
1992, the USPTO sought to clarify the duty to disclose material 
information by narrowing the scope of what could constitute material 
information.29  The text of the amended Rule 1.56(b) stated that: 
 
information is material to patentability when it is not cumulative 
to information already of record or being made of record in the 
application, and 
 (1)[i]t establishes, by itself or in combination with other 
information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or 
 (2)[i]t refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant 
takes in: 
 (i)[o]pposing an argument of unpatentability relied 
on by the Office, or 
 (ii)[a]sserting an argument of patentability.30  
 
The Federal Circuit initially refined its materiality analysis in 
reaction to the amended Rule 1.56(b).  Notably, in Critikon, Inc. v. 
Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., the Federal Circuit stated, 
without reference to other standards, that the amended Rule 1.56(b) 
was the “starting point” of any inquiry under the doctrine of inequitable 
conduct, a standard subsequently adopted by several other cases.31  
 
29. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (1992); see also 57 Fed. Reg. 2023 (1992).  For additional review 
of the amendments, see generally Symposium, Evolution and the Future of New Rule 56 and 
the Duty of Candor, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 131 (1992).  
30. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b).  
31. 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  See also Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. 
Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating that “[i]n evaluating materiality, [the 
Federal Circuit] has consistently referred to the standard set forth in [US]PTO Rule 56,” and 
furthermore, “[b]ecause all of the patent applications at issue in this case were pending on or 
filed after March 16, 1992, we look to the current version of Rule 56, rather than the pre-1992 
version of the rule”); Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 
1348, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that in choosing which version of the rule to apply, the 
Federal Circuit gives “deference to the [US]PTO’s formulation at the time an application is 
being prosecuted before an examiner of the standard of conduct it expects to be followed in 
proceedings in the Office”).  
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The Federal Circuit, however, since Critikon has reasserted its 
prerogative to maintain institutional flexibility in two significant ways.  
Initially, the Federal Circuit has continued to assert its powers to use 
more than one materiality standard.  In Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles 
Machine Works, the Federal Circuit reviewed whether a district court 
had erred by applying the “reasonable examiner” standard rather than 
the narrower amended rule issued by the USPTO in 1992.32  In holding 
that the district court had not erred in using the “reasonable examiner” 
standard, the Federal Circuit re-affirmed its prerogative to use multiple 
standards.33  The Court contended that the narrowly amended Rule 1.56 
did not replace or supplant the case law precedent which allowed 
multiple standards, nor was the amended Rule 1.56 intended to replace 
the older reasonable examiner standard.34  The Federal Circuit’s holding 
in Digital Control indicates that its priority is that courts have all of the 
relevant tools to undertake their role in the equitable assessment that 
underlies the doctrine of inequitable conduct.  Thus, it will tolerate the 
existence of multiple standards in an effort to preserve this flexibility.  
Recently, however, the Federal Circuit has moved beyond simple 
tolerance of multiple standards to active encouragement of one 
particular standard: the reasonable examiner standard.35  The reasonable 
examiner standard is typically understood as the broadest available 
standard,36 thus giving a court the maximum flexibility to undertake the 
sliding scale of materiality and intent, at the heart of the inequitable 
conduct inquiry.  In at least four cases, eSpeed, Inc. v. BrokerTec USA, 
L.L.C.,37 McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc.,38 
 
32. 437 F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
33. Id.    
34. Id. (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2024 (Jan. 17, 1992) (noting that the “[t]he rules do 
not define fraud or inequitable conduct which have elements both of materiality and of 
intent”)). 
35. The reasonable examiner standard was originally promulgated by the USPTO, 
which provides that materiality should be judged by whether “a reasonable examiner” would 
consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent.  37 
C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1977); see also 42 Fed. Reg. 3732 (1976) (publication of proposed Rule 1.56); 
42 Fed. Reg. 5580 (publication of issued rules).  
36. See American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984) (The reasonable examiner was “an appropriate starting point for any discussion of 
materiality, for it appears to be the broadest, thus encompassing the others, and because that 
materiality boundary most closely aligns with how one ought to conduct business with the 
[US]PTO.”).  
37. 480 F.3d 1129, 1136–37 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
38. 487 F.3d 897, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
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Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc.,39 and Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,40 the Federal Circuit has re-asserted the 
primacy of the reasonable examiner standard.   
The Federal Circuit first reasserted the primacy of the reasonable 
examiner standard in eSpeed.41  In eSpeed, the Federal Circuit used the 
“reasonable examiner” standard to affirm the district court’s findings of 
materiality.  In justifying its application of the “reasonable examiner” 
standard, the Federal Circuit evaluated whether an applicant’s 
subsequent declarations that aimed to disclose and cure the earlier non-
disclosure of certain facts would have been important to a “reasonable 
examiner” in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a 
patent.42  The Federal Circuit’s holding in eSpeed foreshadowed a key 
trend in subsequent cases, namely, that its previous tolerance of 
multiple standards appears to have been replaced by the use of one sole 
standard.   
At least three subsequent cases have applied the rule announced in 
eSpeed.  First, in McKesson, the Federal Circuit applied the “reasonable 
examiner” standard to affirm the district court’s findings with respect to 
materiality of the undisclosed competitor’s patent during prosecution of 
the application.43  The Federal Circuit’s definition of materiality in 
McKesson parallels its earlier language in Digital Control in that the 
court may judge the materiality of information withheld during 
prosecution by the “reasonable examiner” standard.44  Second, in 
Nilssen, the Federal Circuit applied the “reasonable examiner” standard 
to affirm the district court’s findings that the references withheld by the 
applicant were material.45  Finally, in Pfizer, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
 
39. 504 F.3d 1223, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
40. 518 F.3d 1353, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
41. 480 F.3d at 1138–39 (stating that under the reasonable examiner standard, 
information is material when “a reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding 
whether to allow the application to issue as a patent”). 
42. Id. 
43. McKesson, 487 F.3d at 913.   
44. See Digital Control Inc., 437 F.3d at 1316 (“[B]ecause a party alleging inequitable 
conduct need only prove a ‘threshold level’ of materiality in order to proceed to the second 
‘balancing’ portion of the inequitable conduct inquiry, and because the [US]PTO’s 
‘reasonable examiner’ standard was broader than the other three standards, the [US]PTO 
standard gradually became the sole standard invoked by this court.”). 
45. Nilssen, 504 F.3d at 1235.  In applying the “reasonable examiner” standard, the 
Federal Circuit stated that “the fact that Nilssen had repeatedly cited or had cited to him the 
prior art references in question makes it highly likely that a reasonable examiner would have 
wanted to consider the information in the withheld patents in determining patentability.”  Id.  
In Nilssen, the Federal Circuit’s definition of materiality parallels its earlier language in 
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applied the “reasonable examiner” standard to affirm the district court’s 
decision that references not disclosed by the applicant during 
prosecution of patents at issue were not material since the applicant did 
not intend to deceive the USPTO by failing to disclose the references.46  
This recent precedent shows the Federal Circuit acting at the zenith of 
its institutional prerogative to interpret the contours of the doctrine of 
inequitable conduct.   
The Federal Circuit’s institutional desire to maintain maximum 
flexibility in its assessment of inequitable conduct, however, distorts 
other major goals of the patent regime, such as the transparency over 
what constitutes misconduct before the USPTO.  The Federal Circuit’s 
assertion of its institutional power is further amplified by the USPTO’s 
corresponding institutional weakness.  The USPTO’s use of notice and 
comment rulemaking to enact many of its clarifying standards may not 
be within the scope of its enumerated duties under Section 2 of the 
Patent Act, which only permits the USPTO to undertake procedural 
rulemakings that govern the conduct of the proceedings before the 
Office.47  Indeed, R. Carl Moy, writing during the passage of the 1992 
amendments of Rule 1.56, concluded that it “appears that new Rule 
[1.]56, when viewed as an attempt to correct the law of inequitable 
conduct, is outside the APA [Administrative Procedure Act].  It is 
neither a substantive, interpretive, nor procedural rule, nor is it a 
statement of policy.”48  Moy’s conclusion, in many respects, has been 
confirmed by the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Tafas v. Doll, in 
which the court held that Section 2 of the Patent Act does not vest the 
USPTO with any substantive rulemaking powers.49  Thus, the USPTO, 
 
Honeywell with respect to the definition of what constitutes the material information.  See 
Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(“Information is material ‘if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner 
would have considered the information important in deciding whether to allow the 
application to issue as a patent.’”) (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 
F.2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1989))). 
46. Pfizer, Inc., 518 F.3d at 1366. 
47. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2006) (USPTO “may establish regulations, not inconsistent 
with law, which . . . shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office”). 
48. R. Carl Moy, The Effect of New Rule 56 on the Law of Inequitable Conduct, 74 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 257, 276 (1992).  Interestingly, Caspar W. Ooms, the then 
Commissioner of Patents, at the time of the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”), also noted that the practice of “striking an application” for fraud before the 
issuance was potentially unreviewable behavior under the APA.   Caspar W. Ooms, The 
United States Patent Office and the Administrative Procedure Act, 38 TRADEMARK BULL. 149, 
156 (1947).   
49. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 2009).   
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when it seeks, periodically, to clarify patent fraud enforcement 
mechanisms, is operating at its weakest institutional power.  This 
inequity in institutional power will continue to provide the Federal 
Circuit with a disproportionate impact on the contours of the current 
patent fraud mechanism, with the attendant negative effect on the 
transparency of the overall patent regime.  
B. Compromised Authority of the Public Interest 
The institutional conflict between the Federal Circuit and the 
USPTO is a visible sign of the decline of the compromised standard of 
inequitable conduct; less visible is the doctrine’s failure to effectively 
provide a robust vision of public participation in policing patent fraud.  
This particular problem is less visible because the “public interest” 
purpose behind the provision of a patent fraud mechanism has always 
been stated in clear and certain terms.  As the Supreme Court stated in 
Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance 
Machinery Co.,50 
 
[t]he possession and assertion of patent rights are “issues of great 
moment to the public.” Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-
Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 [(1947)].  See also Mercoid Corp. 
v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 
[(1944)]; Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., [314 U.S. 488, 492-94 
(1942)]; United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 
[(1942)].  A patent by its very nature is affected with a public 
interest. As recognized by the Constitution, it is a special 
privilege designed to serve the public purpose of promoting the 
“Progress of Science and useful Arts.” At the same time, a patent 
is an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the 
right to access to a free and open market.  The far-reaching social 
and economic consequences of a patent, therefore, give the 
public a paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies 
spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable 
conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their 
legitimate scope.51 
 
Even these clear words, however, mask significant uncertainties 
 
50. 324 U.S. 806, 815–16 (1945); see also Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire 
Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1947) (contending that patent rights are “issues of great moment to the 
public”).  
51. 324 U.S. at 815–16. 
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associated with the status of the “public interest,” as vindicated by 
patent fraud enforcement mechanisms.  First, the doctrine of 
inequitable conduct—like many of the doctrines mentioned by the 
Supreme Court in Precision Instrument (such as the doctrine of “patent 
misuse”)—was never fully incorporated into the current patent regime.  
Second, Precision Instrument never mentions a key question in terms of 
defining the public interest: the party that is in the best position to 
enforce that public interest.  As stated by Michael Waterstone 
(referencing various civil rights statutes), “[e]ven the most far-reaching 
and thoughtfully drafted statutes need to be enforced to have any real 
impact.”52  A key compromise associated with the doctrine of 
inequitable conduct is a deeply constrained view of who is to enforce the 
doctrine, a view which is consistent with the overall goals of the Patent 
Act of 1952, but which currently has significant limits for the present 
state of patent fraud enforcement.  
The current patent administrative regime (as most aptly embodied 
by the Patent Act of 1952) never fully incorporated a number of 
doctrines, such as patent misuse, inequitable conduct and antitrust 
exceptions.53  For instance, key limits were placed on the defense of 
patent misuse in Section 271(d).54  Equally evident, however, is that the 
doctrine of inequitable conduct itself was not easily incorporated into 
the Patent Act of 1952.  The first three drafts of the Patent Act did not 
contain explicit references to the doctrine at all.55  Indeed, it is unclear 
 
52. Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 
435 (2007).  
53. The linkage of antitrust law to fraudulent procurement of a patent occurred 
primarily in the 1960s.  See William Cochran, Historical Review of Fraud in Patent 
Procurement: The Standards and Procedures for Doing Business Before the Patent Office, 52 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 71, 74 (1970).  
54. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1952).  
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory 
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal 
extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the 
following: (1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without his 
consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or 
authorized another to perform acts which if performed without his consent would 
constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent 
rights against infringement or contributory infringement . . . . 
Id.  A key additional aspect of patent fraud enforcement contemplated by the 1952 Act was 
its ability to use disclaimers to avoid error from inadvertent mistakes.  Karl Lutz, The Patent 
Act of 1952, 35 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 155, 161 (1953).   
55. The first draft only protected those defenses actually enumerated in the statute 
itself. See House Bill to Revise Title 35, H.R. 9133, 81st Cong. § 242 (1951).  
In any action for infringement the defendant, in addition to absence of infringement 
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whether the equitable defenses were to be included in the scope of the 
act.  For instance, in May 1952, in its assessment of a draft of section 
282, the House Report Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and 
Copyrights of the Committee stated that “[t]he defenses to a suit for 
infringement are stated in general terms, changing the language in the 
present statute, but not materially the substance.”56  This statement is a 
fairly crucial one, as the previous Patent Act had only prohibited filing a 
specification that contained false information and making a false claim 
of inventorship.57  Thus, it was unclear whether the broader remedy 
associated with the defense of inequitable conduct was available,58 and 
indeed, the key provision adding the defense of unenforceability was 
not added until June 1952, a month before the passage of the Patent Act 
in July 1952.59  The difficult passage of Section 282 indicates the 
continuing difficulty of outlining appropriate fraudulent patent 
enforcement consistent with the Patent Act of 1952. 
Moreover, the doctrine of inequitable conduct, as enacted, contained 
considerable limits on who could enforce it.  Section 282 permits a claim 
of inequitable conduct to be raised only as a defense.60  This limitation 
 
or absence of liability for infringement may plead as a defense the invalidity of the 
patent or any claim thereof on any ground specified in chapter 2 of this title as a 
condition of patentability, or for failure to comply with the requirements of Section 
112 or 201 of this title; or any fact or act made a defense by this title. 
Id.  The second draft divided the remedy of a civil action and the presumption of validity into 
two different sections.  House Bill to Revise Title 35, H.R. 3070, 82nd Cong. 1st Sess. §§ 241, 
242 (1951).  The defenses were included in Section 242, but failed as in the previous draft to 
mention any potential equitable defenses.  Id. § 242 (1)–(4).  Subsequent drafts reflected this 
division.  See House Bill to Revise Title 35, H.R. 7794, 82nd Cong. 2nd Sess. §§ 281, 282 
(1952).     
56. Report from the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representative to Accompany 
H.R. 7794, H. R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 10 (1952).  
57. Section 4920 outlined two defenses related to potential fraudulent behavior:  
(1) filing a specification with false information; and (2) making a claim that contained 
inventorship.  Patent Act of 1897, Ch. 391, § 4920, 29 Stat. 692–94 (1897).  
58. P.J. Frederico, one of the primary authors of the Patent Act of 1952, stated that the 
term of “unenforceability” “was added by amendment in the Senate for greater clarity.”  P.J. 
Frederico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161, 
215 (1993) (reprint); see also Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med. Techs., Inc., 277 F.3d 
1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (referring to commentary of P.J. Frederico in assessment of the 
inclusion of Section 282(1)).    
59. The Senate Bill amended the House Bill version of Section 282(1) to state the 
following:  “[t]he following shall be defenses in any action involving the validity or 
infringement of a patent and shall be pleaded . . . (1) [n]oninfringement, absence of liability 
for infringement, or unenforceability.”  Senate Bill to Revise Title 35, H.R. 7794, 82d Cong. 
§ 282(1) (2nd Sess. 1952)(amending Section 282 to add defense of unenforceability). 
60. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). 
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reflects two key elements that significantly compromise the use of the 
doctrine of inequitable conduct.  Initially, the contours of the doctrine 
itself are not outlined in the text of the Patent Act.  This, in large part, 
results from the doctrine’s origins as a response to the government’s 
failure to pursue its ability to cancel a patent in light of the patentee’s 
potentially fraudulent behavior (a capacity first discussed in United 
States v. American Bell Telephone Co.).61  Thus, the doctrine of 
inequitable conduct itself was always in some respect a “stop-gap” 
equitable measure that sought to correct the government’s failure to 
effectively police fraudulent behavior. 
Perhaps the doctrine was never meant to be the only way in which 
one could undertake to police fraud.  This equitable basis attaches 
significant uncertainty to the doctrine, which is intensified by the failure 
to include even a basic statutory text that outlines the primary elements 
of the defense.  Additionally, the doctrine itself, by being a defense to 
an action, could be brought by only one set of parties: the patent’s 
competitors.  The limits placed on standing reflect the narrow bilateral 
conversation—between the patentee and its competitors—at the heart 
of the Patent Act.62  This narrows, considerably, the circumstances in 
which a claim of inequitable conduct is even brought: the patentee must 
have first raised a claim under Section 281, and then the competitor 
raises the issue of inequitable conduct as an affirmative defense.63  Thus, 
a potentially broad public interest is funneled through the narrowest 
potential range of advocates.  
II. RETHINKING THE PATENT FRAUD COMPROMISE 
Our current patent fraud enforcement mechanism, the doctrine of 
inequitable conduct, is deeply compromised because it fosters unhealthy 
institutional conflict between the two primary actors of the patent 
regime, as well as depends on, in large part, a limited range of enforcers, 
the patentee’s private competitors.  What, then, are the alternatives?  
The remarkable ferment over the current patent reform offers the 
 
61. 128 U.S. 315 (1888).  
62. Kali N. Murray, Rules for Radicals: A Politics of Patent Law, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
63, 79–80 (2006) (discussing bilateral standing compromise outlined by Section 281).  Notably, 
the legislative history of the Act suggests that Section 281 and Section 282 were seen as 
linked.  Section 281 outlined the broad power retained by the patentee to initiate suit while 
Section 282 granted it a strong presumption of validity and limited the ways in the which the 
patent could be challenged.  See supra note 55 (outlining legislative history of these two 
provisions). 
63. Murray, supra note 62.   
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opportunity to fundamentally reconsider the “DNA” of any new patent 
fraud mechanism.  This Section considers the larger principles that 
should be used to determine the alternatives. 
Two principles may be necessary as we consider a “re-write” of our 
current patent fraud mechanisms.  First, patent fraud enforcement 
mechanisms are necessarily linked to the larger values of their 
respective patent regimes.  For example, the Patent Acts of 1790 and 
1793, which promoted a system without significant examination of 
patents, both contained cancellation proceedings that allowed repeal of 
a patent obtained “surreptitiously by, or upon false suggestion.”64  The 
availability of a strong cancellation proceeding necessarily prevented 
fraudulent behavior that could arise in a system with little or weak 
examination of the respective patent application.  Likewise, the Patent 
Act of 1952 proceeded with a basic theoretical perspective that a patent 
regime worked most effectively with a constrained set of public values.  
The textual philosophy of the Patent Act of 1952 reflects a key choice: a 
patent system achieves the maximum public value by strongly protecting 
the rights of the patentee.  This premise is most clearly stated by Giles 
Rich in his summary of the major innovations of the Patent Act: 
“[p]rogress is most effectively promoted by protecting those who enrich 
the art as well as those who improve it.”65  Thus, the text of the act 
provided that an issued patent has a strong presumption of validity, the 
patentee has sole power to initiate a claim of patent infringement, and 
patent fraud enforcement was a task largely undertaken by a patentee’s 
competitors. 
While this model has recently shown signs of significant strains—
strains often seen most acutely in the compromised doctrine of 
inequitable conduct—the crafting of the Patent Act of 1952 appears in 
contrast to much current patent reform.  Congress is contemplating both 
major theoretical shifts (such as a first-to-file system) and major 
procedural shifts (such as a post-grant proceeding).  Yet, these 
suggested changes are not often linked to any broader theoretical 
discussion about the “progress” that is being served by these important 
 
64. Section 5 of the Patent Act of 1790 allowed for a repeal action within one year of 
the issuance of a patent.  Act of Apr. 10, 1790, Ch.7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111.  Section 10 of the 
Patent Act allowed for a cancellation proceeding within three years of issuance of a patent.  
Act of Feb. 21, 1793, Ch. 11, § 10, 1 Stat. 318, 323.  Robert Goldman has written extensively 
about the early history of patent fraud enforcement in the United States.   Robert Goldman, 
Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37 
(1993) (outlining early history of patent fraud mechanisms in the United States). 
65. Giles S. Rich, The Principles of Patentability, 42 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 75, 85 (1960). 
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changes.  Such a clarification might help to answer the key questions 
that any discussion of patent fraud mechanisms is likely to raise, such as 
what is the best allocation between public and private interests in a 
patent system, or who is in the best position to enforce the important 
public goals of the system.  
Indeed, Congress is moving towards a patent system with a much 
different point of view than that of the Patent Act of 1952.  This 
perspective seems to view “the public interest” in substantially different 
ways than the Patent Act of 1952.  The public interest is not being 
simply demarcated by providing the patentee with the strongest 
ownership rights.  Rather the public interest is being demarcated as 
allowing for the issuance of only those patents that can withstand the 
strongest scrutiny (thus preserving a stronger public domain).  This 
perspective is seen most clearly by the inclusion of post-grant opposition 
proceedings in which an issued patent is subject to any number of 
challenges by a potentially unlimited range of interested third parties.66  
This move suggests that different types of patent fraud mechanisms are 
necessary.  Varying enforcement mechanisms are potentially available.  
First, the statute could define materiality, thus limiting a need to resort 
to varying administrative and judicial definitions.  Second, the statute 
could contain an expanded civil remedy that would allow a broader 
range of interested parties to make a claim that the patentee had acted 
in a fraudulent manner.  Finally, additional criminal remedies could be 
included to reinforce that fraudulent behavior should not be 
undertaken. 
Notably, the Canadian Patent Act contains each of these three 
elements.  Section 53(1) defines materiality: “[a] patent is void if any 
material allegation in the petition of the applicant in respect of the 
patent is untrue . . . and the omission or addition is wilfully [sic] made 
for the purpose of misleading.”67  Section 60(1) allows an independent 
private right of action to be brought to declare a patent void for 
fraudulent behavior on the part of the patent owner: any “patent or any 
claim in a patent may be declared invalid or void by the Federal Court 
at the instance of the Attorney General of Canada or at the instance of 
any interested person.”68  Finally, Section 76 outlines criminal remedies 
that result in a fine against and/or imprisonment of any person who 
 
66. Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 11th Cong. § 321 (2009) (allowing any person to 
raise a challenge related to invalidity under Section 282).  
67. Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, §53.  
68. Id. § 60(1). 
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makes a false representation or produces or tenders a document that 
contains false remedies.69  Reading these three provisions together, 
Canada’s Patent Act makes very clear the significant compromises 
made in our current patent fraud enforcement regime.  Our current 
patent fraud enforcement mechanism lacks a clear standard of 
materiality, lacks any ability to effectively structure third-party 
participation mechanisms beyond competitors, and lacks any additional 
disincentives from committing fraudulent acts.  A real question, then, 
has to be whether our continual attempts to tinker around the edges of 
the compromised doctrine of inequitable conduct can accomplish any 
fundamental good.   
Second, any patent fraud mechanism should seek to lessen the 
institutional competition between the two primary actors within the 
current patent regime.  The key conflict between the USPTO and the 
Federal Circuit is a significant one that undermines the clarity of the 
current regime.  Thus, any suggested patent reform mechanisms should 
seek to lessen that particular conflict and find a healthy institutional 
balance between the two major parties.   
While current patent reform has not shown any distinctive 
appreciation of the first principle, it appears that some appreciation 
exists for the second one.  Congress has considered substantive patent 
reform during the 109th Congress, the 110th Congress, and the 111th 
Congress, and although not all of the bills have included provisions 
related to patent fraud mechanisms,70 a number of them included major 
revisions of the patent fraud mechanism.  Some bills have only tinkered 
around the edges of the doctrine.  For instance, H.R. 1908, as passed by 
the House of Representatives in July 2008, maintained the defense of 
inequitable conduct, referenced both USPTO standards (the reasonable 
examiner and objective standards) as necessary for the overall 
materiality analysis, and limited the type of relief available depending 
on a finding of equitable relief.71   
Other versions of the bills, however, have sought to substantively re-
balance the institutional conflict between the USPTO and the trial 
courts over patent fraud determinations.  For instance, proposed 
Section 5 of H.R. 2795 outlined a dual enforcement mechanism in which 
 
69. Id. § 76.  
70. Bills that did not include a patent fraud mechanism, include the Patent Reform Act 
of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009), the Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. 
(2007), and the Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818 (2006).   
71. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 12 (2007). 
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the USPTO or court could determine whether a person subject to a duty 
of good faith and candor, knowingly and with the intent to deceive, 
failed to disclose or misrepresented material information.72  Notably, 
however, under Section 5, the court would be limited to assessing a 
claim related to unenforceability, only where  (1) the validity of one or 
more claims in the patent was at issue; (2) the court had previously 
entered a judgment in the action that a claim in the patent is invalid; 
(3) the motion to amend the pleadings was brought by a party to the 
action adverse to the patent owner within three months after a 
judgment was entered by the court invalidating the claim; and (4) the 
motion outlined a number of substantive grounds for its claims.73 
In this regard, Senator John Kyl has been a particular innovator, 
offering interesting solutions that seek to effectively re-balance the 
institutional relationships between the USPTO and the Federal Circuit.  
In 2008, he submitted a version of the Patent Reform Act of 2008.74  
That act would have required that, upon a finding that more likely than 
not a patentee concealed material information or submitted false 
material information,75 a judge could initiate a separate reissue 
application proceeding under Section 251.  During that proceeding, the 
USPTO would make an assessment of the relevant misconduct and, if a 
finding of patent fraud was found, issue a variety of civil sanctions.76  In 
2009, Senator Kyl submitted another version of the Patent Reform Act 
of 2009,77 which eliminated the reissue procedure, but once again 
proposed that the Director of the USPTO conduct a proceeding that 
would assess whether intentionally deceptive behavior had occurred in 
proceedings before the Office.78  The various suggestions outlined by 
these bills suggest a considerable awareness that one of the primary 
flaws of the current standard is the failure to accurately balance the 
institutional competition between the USPTO and the Federal Circuit.  
For instance, Senator Kyl’s suggestions would remove private parties’ 
ability to raise the defense of inequitable conduct, but at the same time 
would increase the USPTO’s power to consider stronger remedies 
against potential misconduct.   
 
72. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 5 (2005).  
73. Id.   
74. Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. §§ 298–99 (2008).  
75. Id. § 298(b). 
76. Id. § 299(b)(3). 
77. Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, 111th Cong. § 299 (2009). 
78. Id. § 299(c)(3)(A)–(C). 
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Thus, current patent reform is correctly experimenting with revising 
the institutional balance between the USPTO and the Federal Circuit in 
undertaking patent fraud enforcement.  Unfortunately, however, early 
efforts to strengthen the rule-making power of the USPTO seem largely 
abandoned in current drafts of the bills.79  Indeed, more curious aspects 
of recent bills have been the expansion of the powers of the USPTO, in 
a number of key respects, such as the ability to undertake post-grant 
proceedings,80 as well as policing patent fraud, without a corresponding 
increase in its ability to undertake substantive rule-making under 
Section 2 of the Patent Act.  Institutional re-balancing within the 
context of patent fraud reform would be fruitless if the current contours 
of USPTO authority remain static. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress’s basic refusal to consider new patent enforcement 
doctrines demonstrates that Congress continues to attempt to engraft 
remnants of the former system onto its new animal.  These consistent 
attempts demonstrate that instead of understanding its actions as a 
profound re-working of the basic “DNA,” our current patent regime 
reinforces how much farther Congress and the patent community may 
need to go in articulating what its actual goals are for reform.  This 
Article contends, in the end, that instead of asking once again, what 
type of materiality standard is necessary, the patent community needs to 
ask itself a larger question: what kind of patent system do we want to 
have?  Answering that question may help us to avoid the current 
compromises that have deeply wounded application of our current 
patent fraud mechanism, the doctrine of inequitable conduct.  
 
 
79. Compare S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 6(e)(5) (“[T]he Director may promulgate such 
rules, regulations, and orders as the Director determines appropriate to carry out the 
provisions of this title or any other law applicable to the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office or that the Director determines necessary to govern the operation and organization of 
the Office.”) with H.R 1260, 111th Cong. § 11(a) (“[T]he Director shall have authority to set 
or adjust by rule any fee established or charged by the Office under sections 41 and 376 of 
title 35, United States Code or under section 31 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 
1113) for the filing or processing of any submission to, and for all other services performed by 
or materials furnished by, the Office, provided that such fee amounts are set to reasonably 
compensate the Office for the services performed.”). 
80. See, e.g., H.R. 1260, § 32 (outlining post-grant proceedings); S. 515, § 32 (same). 
